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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-IMPUTATION OF NOTICE AS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-
DISHONEST CONDUCT OF AGENT-[Federal].-Action on a bank's blanket
fidelity bond. Board of directors of plaintiff bank instructed its cashier to
sign in its behalf the application for the bond. The cashier, although
knowing of his own past fraud and dishonesty, represented in the applica-
tion that no losses were known to have been sustained by the bank and
that its officers and employees scheduled in the application were honest.
Held, for defendant. The cashier's knowledge of the fraud is imputed to
the plaintiff, and the representation being false the contract is vitiated.1
The general rule is that a principal is chargeable with the notice or
knowledge received by its agent within the scope of the agency.2 This rule
is generally based either upon the theory of the legal identity of principal
and agent,3 or upon the theory that it is the duty of the agent to disclose
his knowledge to the principal and that the agent is presumed to have
discharged that duty.4 A well-established exception to this rule is that a
principal is not charged with the knowledge of its agent where the latter
is acting for his own benefit and adversely to the interest of the principal,r
because it can not be presumed that the agent will communicate such
knowledge to his principal. 6
Where, however, the principal seeks to enforce the benefit of a trans-
action based on a fraud perpetrated by its agent on a third party, it has
been frequently held, in denying recovery, that the dishonest agent's knowl-
edge is imputed to the principal on the ground that a principal accepts the
burdens as well as the benefits of its agent's acts. 7 But the majority of
1. First Nat'l Bank of Weatherly v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (C. C.
A. 3, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 339.
2. Curtis Co. v. United States (1922) 262 U. S. 215; Gibson Oil Co. v.
Hayes Equipment Mfg. Co. (1933) 163 Okla. 134, 21 P. (2d) 17, 88 A. L. R.
104; Hickman v. Green (1894) 123 Mo. 165, 22 S. W. 455, 27 S. W. 440, 29
L. R. A. 39; Hicks v. American Natural Gas Co. (1904) 207 Pa. 570, 57 Atl.
55, 65 L. R. A. 209.
3. Hall & Brown Woodworking Mach. Co. v. Haley Furniture & Mfg. Co.
(1911) 174 Ala. 190, 56 So. 726; Sooy v. State (1879) 41 N. J. L. 394;
Houseman v. Gerard Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n (1876) 81 Pa. 256.
4. The Distilled Spirits (U. S. 1870) 11 Wall. 356; Henryv. Allen (1896)
151 N. Y. 1, 45 N. E. 355, 36 L. R. A. 658; Traders' & Truckers' Bank v.
Black (1908) 108 Va. 59, 60 S. E. 743.
5. Appeal of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1932) 310 Pa. 17, 164 Atl. 715,
86 A. L. R. 1301; American Nat'l Bank v. Miller (1913) 229 U. S. 517.
6. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Capitol Electric Co. (C. C. A. 6,
1894) 65 Fed. 341; Sebald v. Citizens' Deposit Bank (1907) 31 Ky. L. 1244,
105 S. W. 130, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 376; Allen v. South Boston R. R. (1889)
150 Mass. 200, 22 N. E. 917, 5 L. R. A. 716, 15 Am. St. Rep. 185.
7. Knobeloch v. Germania Say. Bank (1897) 50 S. C. 259, 27 S. E. 962;
Taylor v. Flynt (1902) 28 Tex. Civ. App. 219, 67 S. W. 347. See Restate-
ment, Agency (1933) 625, sec. 282 (2c); also 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.
1914) 1404, sec. 1818.
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courts hold the contrary where, as here, the benefit sought to be enforced
is the liability on a fidelity bond executed by the dishonest agent.8
It would seem that the question of whether an insured shall be permitted
to recover in this latter situation should turn on a question of contract
rather than on the technical doctrine of imputed notice.9 Probably the
parties had no "actual intention" with respect to the matter in issue at
the time the contract was executed. Where such ambiguity of intent exists,
the courts of necessity must determine what the parties would have intended
had the specific question been presented at the time;' 0 and it would seem
fair to assume that, if it had been considered when the bond was issued, the
parties would have intended that the bond cover the matter.
The federal court in the present case, however, was required" to follow
Pennsylvania law' 2 which denies recovery to the principal because of the
doctrine of imputed notice. It is submitted that the better rule is in
accord with the majority view which permits a recovery on the bond. 13
P. H. A.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORIANCE AND INJUNCTION-INEXACT AND DISCRE-
TIONARY OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTING PARTiEs-[Federal].-Defendant in-
vented and patented a unique type of military tank. By contract, plaintiff
became the exclusive agent of defendant for the sale and manufacture of
8. American Surety Co. v. Pauly (1898) 170 U. S. 133; Maryland Cas-
ualty Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan & Inv. Co. (1936) 83 F. (2d) 14, 105
A. L. R. 529; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Nat'l Bank (1895) 97 Ga.
634, 25 S. E. 392, 33 L. R. A. 821, 54 Am. St. Rep. 440.
9. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gate City Nat'l Bank (1895) 97 Ga.
634, 25 S. E. 392, 393, 33 L. R. A. 821, 54 Am. St. Rep. 440, Lumpkin, J.,
said, "* * * we cannot think that the parties to this contract contemplated
that the bank would be bound to act upon mere constructive notice of Red-
wine's [the agent] shortcomings. The 'knowledge' referred to meant actual
knowledge."
10. Reed v. Insurance Co. (1877) 95 U. S. 23; Higgins v. California
Petroleum & Asphalt Co. (1898) 120 Cal. 629, 52 Pac. 1080; Hamill & Co.
v. Woods (1895) 95 Iowa 246, 62 N. W. 735. See Corbin, Contracts (16th
ed. 1924) 425, sec. 354.
11. Under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 114
A. L. R. 1487. The court said, per Maris, J.: "The mere fact that the
decision in Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, would seem to us
somewhat out of line with the general trend of the authorities both in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere cannot, under the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tomp-
kins, above cited, be of more than academic interest to this court." First
Nat'l Bank of Weatherly v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1939)
105 F. (2d) 339, 341.
12. Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co. (1935) 319 Pa. 555, 181 At. 574,
104 A. L. R. 1238.
13. Generally, where a contractual ambiguity arises in the case of fidelity
or guarantee contracts, the courts construe them strictly against the in-
surer, and such surety's obligation is not considered to be strictissimi juris.
Galveston Causeway Construction Co. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. (D. C.
S. D. Tex. 1922) 284 Fed. 137; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Northern Granite
& Stone Co. (1919) 100 Ohio 373, 126 N. E. 405, 12 A. L. R. 378. See Note
(1921) 12 A. L. R. 382, where many authorities are collected.
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